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is theoretically distinct from and preliminary to them all. The funda-
mental social science is sociology.
As the reader will have discovered, my own notions of utility and its
relations to social phenomena have been made more definite by Dr.
Patten’s criticism. I am grateful to him for it.
Columbia College.
FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.
THE ORGANIC CONCEPT OF SOCIETY.
In a recent book * Professor Small discusses and defends the organic
concept of society and quotes certain passages from a paper t of mine
to show how this concept has been misunderstood. I, in turn, might
properly complain that my meaning has been misconstrued. There
is, however, nothing to be gained in joining an issue on so technical
a point. If Professor Small’s book had appeared in advance of my
paper, I would have gladly referred to it for a statement of the doc-
trines to which I take exception. His book strengthens rather than
weakens my opposition to the use of biologic analogies in the discussion
of social questions. A clear and definite statement of a false position
often exposes its weakness.
The organic concept of society finds its chief strength and sup-
port in the phenomena of co-operation. On every side we see some
form of division of labor ; families unite for common ends, industries
are co-ordinated on a large scale, villages, cities and even nations become
organized parts of a larger whole, and in this way is built up the vast
complexus that is commonly called the industrial organism. Accept-
ing this industrial organism as a fact, it is necessary to inquire into its
cause. Is it a part of the nature of things, the outcome of purely
social forces or is it due to the objective conditions which surround
society? Evidently the latter. Certain peculiarities of soil and
climate give certain localities the advantage in particular forms of
production, certain deposits of iron, coal and other minerals give an
advantage to other localities in these industries and certain other
peculiarities of matter and of the crust of the earth give a great advan-
tage to serial production-to round-about methods-as opposed to
direct production.
The complex economic world is the outcome of the influence of
these objective conditions upon the choices of individuals under these
conditions. Each individual becomes a part of the economic mechan-
ism in order to increase his sum of utilities and to decrease his costs.
* &dquo;An Introduction to the Study of Society,&dquo; by A. W. Small and G. E. Vincent.
New York: 1894.
~&dquo;The Place of University Extension,&dquo; &dquo; Unirersity Ez-tenston, February, iS94.
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From no point of view is society more truly &dquo; organic &dquo; than in its
economic aspect. If then the organic concept is serviceable at all in
social science it should be so to the economist, whose duty it is to
explain the phenomena of co-operation. Economists, however, reject
the organic concept of society and prefer to deduce their economic
laws from the theory of utility and the facts of the objective world.
The individual, even though a unit in a complex mechanism, is still
merely an individual having his choices determined by utilitarian mo-
tives and by objective conditions. Differences in men, whether mental
or physical, are due to the effects of these objective conditions, to which
men must adjust themselves in the several local environments. Isolated
men or groups have their choices limited by the opportunities of the
local environment. The characters and habits of individuals hemmed
in by a narrow environment become so differentiated from those of
other persons adjusted to other local conditions, that distinct nations
or races are formed in each section of the world. Even when large
economic aggregates are formed by the massing of people in particu-
lar localitieg the same objective conditions continue the differentiating
process. The various types of men attracted to the locality by its fav-
orable conditions find a place for themselves, and additional types of
men are evolved through the pressure created by the struggle for
existence. During the first stages of a civilization, while choices are
determined solely by objective conditions and strictly utilitarian
motives, this process of differentiation continues, and the economic
aggregate assumes more and more the character of an organism. If
an economic aggregate were the highest possible type of a society and
a conscious utilitarianism were the only standard for action, there
would be some justification for a biologic concept of society. No
progress would be possible except through a greater differentiation of
individuals and a closer interdependence of the parts. Each indi-
vidual would lose his mobility and would tend to become a mere cell
in a particular part of the social organism.
These economic forces, however, are not the true social forces. The
latter counteract the effects of the economic forces and make men
equal, mobile and similar in mental and physical characteristics.
They take men out from und2r the domination of local, objective con-
ditions and create a common subjective environment which prevents
the differentiation of individuals and the growth of the organic ten.
dency in society. Laws, customs, habits, democratic feelings, ethical
ideals and the other phenomena which constitute the subjective environ-
ment tend to eradicate those mental and physical peculiarities due to
local, objective conditions, and to blend the different races of men into
a common type. The forces of the objective environment create
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immobility, inequality and subordination among individuals. Those
of the subjective environment create mobility, equality and freedom.
The organic concept of society has its origin in an undue emphasis of
the economic elements of social progress. The phenomena of a grow-
ing economic aggregate are studied while the true social forces which
transform economic aggregates into real societies are neglected. Such
studies always give a wrong concept of social progress and lead
usually to a bad system of economics as well.
No better example of the evil results springing from the use of this
method can be found than in the work upon which I am commenting.
The whole of the second book is given up to a description of the
growth of a Western city from its first settlement until the present
time. It is implied that this description illustrates all the various
phases of social structure and activity. In reality, however, it gives
nothing but a picture of the growth of an economic aggregate. It is
the economic and not the social structure that is analyzed. The influ-
ence of the division of labor on a growing population and the stratifi-
cation of society which results from the movement of various types of
men into a new region receive due emphasis. If, however, we compare
the social ideas of the first settlers * or of the rural group with those
of the citizens of the city it will be seen that there has been in this
respect a loss rather than a gain. The area of common action and
impulse has been lessened and strictly utilitarian motives have dis-
placed the higher ideals which brought the first settlers into the locality
and bound them together. The city cannot be aroused to united
action so easily as the rural community. Economic motives and
organic tendencies have gained prominence at the expense of social
progress. Rapid economic integration has caused social disintegra-
tion.
A false concept of social growth is given by such a picture and false
ideals are inculcated which do immeasurable harm. Under the pretext
of describing social growth and structure, a picture of a growing eco-
nomic aggregate is presented under conditions where the truly social
bonds are being weakened by the dominant economic forces. The
errors of socialism are mainly due to picturing such economic aggre-
gates as though they were true societies and representing them as exem-
plifications of the normal tendencies of social progress. Socialists would
have us believe that these organic tendencies are the necessary outcome
of social progress and that we should give up what little freedom
and mobility remain to us in our present economic aggregates and
become like a real organism with diverse functions and immobile cells.
The emphasis of organic analogies tends to strengthen such ideals,
x Pp. 101-104.
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and to cause us to lose sight of the true social forces. If the develop-
ment of the region had been through the natural growth of population
instead of through immigration, the growth of social forces could
have been observed. New customs, laws, rights, duties and ideals
would develop to prevent the stratification of society. The differ-
ences between individuals would be lessened, and their mobility and
freedom would be increased. If these social forces had complete
sway the organic cell would disappear, and the individual would be
freed from the domination of the local peculiarities of the objective
environment.
Professor Small thinks that, in using the term &dquo; race knowledge,&dquo;
I unconsciously adopt the organic concept of society. This, however,
overlooks the distinction I am trying to make. Race knowledge lies
entirely in the individual, and is a social force only because each
individual projects it and makes it a part of his environment. A sub-
jective environment is thus created which supplements the objective
environment.
A teamster, seeing a stone in the road, turns out for it; shortly after
he meets a wagon, and also turns out for it. Is not the motive the
same in both cases, and are not also both choices purely personal ?
In the one case he has a knowledge of stones, in the other a knowl-
edge of certain social regulations, but in both cases the knowledge
plus certain utilitarian considerations determines his action. The
choice in the one case is as purely individual as in the other.
If we ask why he projects this social regulation, and acts on it as
though it were a natural law, we have to consider past conditions and
not present realities. Social laws are of slow growth, and due to the
psychical changes in individuals. However, to an individual under
given conditions, these social laws are as real and objective as are
natural laws. Present forces are either in individuals or in the
environment, and they alone have any influence on the choices of
individuals. Society is the result and not the cause of the action
of individuals. Society is when its members project the same subjec-
five environment, and thus are led to make the same choices. Its
force increases or decreases according as the subjective environment
grows or diminishes. It stands between individuals and nature, and
measures their power over nature.
The fundamental distinction here is the difference between an
organism and its environment. The one implies the other. Every
one admits that the individual is an organism, and that there is an
objective environment to which it must adjust itself. I think all will
agree that the individual and the objective world are not the sole
factors in social progress. The habits, customs, rights and duties
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which bind individuals into a society imply another element which
must be analyzed into a super-organism or into an additional environ-
ment. On the one hand, we can conceive of a social will lying back
of the individual wills through which the actions of individuals are
co-ordinated and combined into a general volition. These social
choices plus the choices of individuals blend into one organism, which
stands opposed to the objective environment of society. On the other
hand, we can conceive of individuals as the sole organisms, and that
the objective environment is supplemented by a new environment
through the habitual actions of these individuals. Each individual
creates his own subjective environment to supplement the objective
environment with which he is in contact. Whenever the objective
conditions and the pressure of utilitarian motives are the same for a
group of individuals, they project the same subjective environment,
and thus form a society.
The advantage of the latter concept consists in its simplicity. It
does not call for any powers, functions or activities beyond those found
in individuals or in the objective world. The subjective environment
is merely the outcome of familiar forces in a new form. Even in the
objective world the secondary qualities are projected and visualized
by the individual. Color, for example, adheres not in the object, but
is placed there by the observer. The same faculty is utilized by the
individual to objectify his habitual choices. He thinks of them as
adhering in the object although created by himself.
The thought of a super-psychology is largely due to the wrong
notion of psychology we have inherited from the English empirical
philosophers. They held it as a goal of progress, if not as a present
reality, that all motives should be strictly utilitarian-a conscious
measuring of pleasures and pains. Habits, customs, natural rights
and ideals were to them remnants of primitive times and should have
no influence on the choices of rational beings. Their psychology
overlooked all elements but those of a conscious calculating utilitari-
anism. They assumed that the individual freed from social tyranny
was incapable of other motives and feelings than those whieh their
philosophy recognized. In this way individual psychology came to be
used to designate the type of psychology these philosophers had in
mind. It might better have been called utilitarian psychology in
contrast to race or social psychology. The one type shows the influ-
ence of an internal principle-utility-on the development of the
psychical instincts, the other shows the influence of external condi-
tions on the same development. All psychology, however, is indi-
vidual and rests on the same ultimate principles, no matter whether the
social or utilitarian elements are dominant.
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The biologic sociologists have accepted this utilitarian concept of
psychology as being the true psychology of individuals and try to
create a super-psychology out of the social elements neglected by the
utilitarian philosophers. They confuse the concrete individual of
society with notions which these philosophers had of this individual
and therefore assume that all psychical elements not recognized by
these philosophers belong to a super-organism back of the individual
to which all social forces are due. This false step makes a super-
psychology a necessity and compels its advocates to use many artificial
and forced analogies in order to convince the reader that social
phenomena differ radically from those of individual activity.
The errors of the biologic sociologists are due to a wrong concept of
the hierarchy of the sciences Making sociology follow directly after
biology, they overlook the fact that at least three important bodies of
knowledge lie back of sociology and separate it from biology, the
theory of goods based on objective conditions ; the theory of utility,
and the theory of social forces. The organic tendencies of society lie
mainly in the first of these fields-the conditions of the objective en-
vironment. If then the latter two theories are neglected, and the
sociologist limits his studies to primitive societies, mere economic
aggregates, where the conditions of the objective environment are
dominant, he seems to prove the organic nature of society. As soon,
however, as the theory of social forces is developed, and the impor-
tance of the subjective environment recognized, the defects of the
organic concept of society become apparent and a new concept must
be created in which, especially for the higher forms of society, the
first place must be given to the forces creating the subjective environ-
ment. S. N. PATTEN.
University of Pennsylvania.
PROFESSOR J. B. CLARK’S USE OF THE TERMS "RENT" AND
"PROFITS."
The paper on &dquo;Rent and Profit&dquo; by Dr. C. W. Macfarlane in the
July ANNALS is of much interest for the clearness with which the
concepts of &dquo; marginal &dquo; and &dquo; differential &dquo; rent are distinguished, as
well as for the attempt to crystallize the distinction in the suggestive,
but hopelessly awkward terms, &dquo; price-determining &dquo; and &dquo; price-
determined &dquo; surplus.
Dr. Macfarlane’s detailed criticisms are less satisfactory-the case
against Professor J. B. Clark being signally inadequate. The plausible
contradiction found in Professor Clark’s saying &dquo; of one and the same
thing that it is the more useful type of true rent, and again, that it is
# See Failure of Biologic Sociology,&dquo; ANNALS, May, 1894.
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